Abstract: For N possible customers or agents and N pricewise identical restaurants (or any other type of service providers), we study the collective dynamical states of choices. Each evening the choice problem of any agent is to go to a restaurant. The agent makes this choice based on two things (a) his/her own past experiences and (b) the past restaurant utilisation records (available to everyone). Moreover, each agent makes his/her choice independent of others, that is we assume that there is no interaction across agents. If more than one agent turns up in any particular restaurant, one of them is randomly selected by the restaurant and the rest do not get any dinner that evening. Although the prices are the same for all the restaurants, there is a prevailing opinion across agents about the preference rankings of these restaurants and it is commonly shared by all the N agents. Of the N N possible states, only N! states are "socially efficient" or Pareto efficient in the sense that no agent can be made better off without making any other agent worse off. This is achieved when all the agents get their dinners. In the absence of mutual interaction across agents occurance of such a Pareto efficient state has a very low probability. However, given the common preference ranking of the restaurant across agents, even under any Pareto optimal state, except for the agent in the highest ranked restaurant that evening, all remaining N − 1 agents are dissatisfied and attempt to change the state, thereby moving to (exponentially many; N → ∞) "socially inefficient" states where many do not get their dinners (and that many restarants waste their foods). Hence there is no "absorbing" state for the dynamics of the system and the daily fluctuations in the underutilisation of the services (number of people not getting dinner on any evening or equivalently the number of restaurants wasting their food) is expected to have power law behaviour. 1
Introduction
Following the earlier version of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem [1] as a generalisation of the El Farol Bar Problem [2] and the consequent Minority Game Problem [3] , we introduce here a very simple version of the game. This is an N agent game, where N can be macroscopically large. The model is intrinsically dynamical in the sense that, the system never converges to any of the states and most of the time, the system passes through "Collectively or Socially Inefficient" states or solutions, where most of the people do not get food and, consequently, many restaurants go unutilised every evening.
The problem
Let us assume that there are N restaurants in Kolkata and each can accommodate a fixed number of customers, normalised to unity (without any loss of generality). Let there be exactly N customers or agents in the city. We also assume that each of the restaurants costs the same for a dinner and if there are more than one agent (prospective customer) arriving in any of these restaurants any evening, one of them is chosen randomly and the rest do not get any dinner that evening [4] . We assume that while deciding for the choice of the restaurant any evening, there is no mutual interaction among the agents, and that they decide simultaneously on the basis of past "experiences" available to each of the agent. There are N N possible scenarios of the customer choices, of which most are "socially inefficient" in the sense that there exists at least one agents not getting dinner and equivalently, there is at least one resturants without a customer. There are exactly N! (i.e., a fraction exp[−N] as N → ∞) choices which correspond to "socially efficient" utilisation of the restaurants and all the customers getting their dinners. In this case, each agent ends up in a different restaurant (certainly not the best choice for N − 1 of the agents, not even the second best choice for N − 2 agents and so on) and each one gets their respective dinners that evening (to their liking or not; although they all pay the same price for their dinners). Even if such a state appears any evening, it gets destabilised in the next evening as the N − 1 customers (who could not get into the highest ranking one), try to move to some other restaurant next evening and the whole system breaks down to any of the infinitely many (fraction exp [N] ; N → ∞) socially inefficient states, where many of the agents remain hungry.
There can be no fixed point result for the problem and the game continues dynam-ically forever. This is because, given the same ranking over restaurants across agents, even in any socially efficient state there exists agents (N − 1 to be exact) who find it profitable to deviate to a better restaurant in the next evening. The system moves to an inefficient state characterized by overcrowding at higher ranking restaurants (absence of any "absorbing" state). The system will therefore oscillate forever occassionally passing through "socially efficient" state.
3 The problem of one evening as a one shot game
The restaurant problem, developed so far under the assumptions of (a) no mutaual interaction across agents and (b) common preference ranking of the restaurants, can also be modelled as a single shot strategic form game repeated every evening. In particular one can construct a class of one shot strategic form game whose set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states. Let |N| = n and u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) ∈ ℜ n represent the utility (in terms of money) associated with each restaurant which is common to all agents. Assume without loss of generality that u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u n so that the N-th restaurant is the best for all agents, (N − 1)-th restaurant is the second best and so on. Let G(u) = (N, S, U) represent a one shot game in strategic form where N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite (may be large) set of players, S is the (common) strategy space of all agents where S = {1, . . . , n} is the strategy space for each agent where a typical strategy s(i) = k denotes the strategy that the i-th agent goes to the k-th restaurant. For each strategy vector s = (s(1), . . . , s(n)) ∈ S n , the payoff to player i is given by
where
Let us consider now the compare some two player games G(u) with some standard games like Prisoner's Dilemma or the Battel of Sexes [7] . The prisoner's dilemma is a typical non-zero-sum game in which two players (called here "Prisoners") may each "cooperate" (C) or "defect" (D; i.e. betray) the other player. If one puts one prisoner's choices of cooperation or defection along the rows, while those for the other along the columns, the payoff matrix can be expressed as
Obviously strategy C is strictly dominated by strategy D for both players. Hence D is the unique strictly dominant strategy for both playes implying that (D, D) is the only the only Nash equilibrium [7] of the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. The unique equilibrium for this game is not a Pareto optimal solution: rational choice leads the two players to both defecting even though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both cooperated. In equilibrium therefore, each prisoner chooses to betray the other even though both would be better off by cooperating. The game battle of sexes is the following: one evening wife and husband wants to either go to the Theatre (T) or to the Cinema (C). The wife prefers to go to the Theatre (T), while the husband prefers cinema (C), but both dislike to get separated. Hence the payoff matrix is the following:
There are two pure strategy and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria of this game. The two pure strategies equilibria are (C,C) and (T,T). Let us consider a single shot two player Kolkata Restaurant problem G(u) with u 1 = 1 and u 2 = 2. The payoff matrix is the following:
This game has three pure strategy Nash equilibria. Note that for this game going to the higher ranked restaurant is a weakly dominant strategy for both players and this results in a payoff of (1,1) which is an inefficient state. However, the pair of strategy combinations that leads to the two Pareto optimal states are also pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Now let us consider another single shot two player Kolkata Restaurant problem G(u ′ ) with u . The payoff matrix is the following:
For the game G(u ′ ) there are exactly two pure strategy Nash equilibria. Moreover, these equilibria corresponds to the two Pareto optimal states. In general, can we identify the class of games G(u) for which the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states of the Kolkata restaurant problem? Proposition 1 (that follows) provides a complete answer to this question.
Consider now the general one shot strategic form game of the Kolkata restaurant problem. Given any vector of utilities u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ ℜ n with the property that u 1 < u 2 < . . . < u n , we can associate a one shot strategic form game G(u) = (N, S, U) . Let G be the class of all such games. Let G ⊂ G be the sub-class of one shot games G(u) = (N, S, U) whose set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria (pure strategy equilibria of the game G(u) = (N, S, U) with the property that no player can benefit from unilateral deviation) coincides with the set of all Pareto optimal states (states under which all agents gets his/her dinner).
Proposition 1 G(u) ∈ G if and only if
Note that the games described in this section are all static or one shot games. While the Kolkata Restaurant Problem defined in the earlier section for general N is intrinsically a dynamical one. However, it can definitely be represented as the repeated game where in each stage we have the same one shot game G(u) ∈ G being played. Players, update their strategies in stage t using just the history of the game played till t − 1 assuming that the history of the game is common knowledge.
Discussion
It may be noted that if there would be no ranking of the restaurants, the dynamics would converge to an absorbing state easily, where everyone gets their dinner from one of the restaurants and the customers do not change their choices and continue to go those restaurants (misue measure thus converges to zero and will have no further fluctuation). This is because, even if everybody starts by random choices among all the N restaurants, and several restaurants get more than one prospective customer and choose one of them each for their own restaurant, the rest going hungry that evening comes to know next evening of the restaurants which went unutilised last evening and chooses from them, while those who got their dinners last night continues to go there. Soon, they converge and each find one restaurant to get their dinner and the dynamics effectively stops there. This is also the case if the agetnts have heterogeneous prefence rankings. Here, only dynamics would continue a little longer until every one finds the restaurant of their own choice (or best choice). However, if there is any universal preference ranking (shared by all), then any such state, long before their covergence to full utilisation, would get destabilised and even the state with full utilisation is not acceptable for N − 1 number of the participating agents and they move away for another state, leading to perpetual dynamics of the system with large fluctuations in the measure of daily misuse. If each agent randomly chooses his/her restaurant every evening, ignoring any experience and information, then the misuse measure statistics will obviously be Gaussian. For any kind of "learning" by the agents, as in this model, we expect the statistics (of the number of people going without any dinner; unemployment of the people or under-utilisation of the resources/restaurants) to have power law fluctuationn behaviour (cf. [2, 3, 5, 6] ). This is indicated by the experiments on the statistics on the length of waiting-lists for hospital consultants [5, 6] , where also people do not want to wait for longtime for any consultant and would go to the next one (ranking next in his/her choice; may be heterogenous). Because of this heterogeniuty in ranking and the absence of "learning" from the experience last time(s) and the general availability of informations in our problem, this waiting-list problem is quite different from ours. Of course, if the agents are allowed to consult among themselves, soon a periodically organised state (with periodicity N) would set in where each one inturn gets dinner in the highest raking restaurant and all get their dinners every evening. For binary values of the ranking, the problem effectively reduces to that for N = 2, discussed later. In short, we introduce here a simpler version of the Kolkata Resturant Problem defined earlier [1] : For N customers and N pricewise identical restaurants (each able to accommodate atmost one customer per evening, chosen randomly if there are more than one customer), each customer makes independent choice for the restaurant every evening, based on his/her previous experience and the generally available information (no mutual consultation) and also the preference ranking of the restaurants (identical for each of the N customers and remaining unchanged over time). There are N N possible scenarios of the customer choices, of which most are "socially inefficient" (many going without food and that many resturants going without any customer). Out of these, exactly N! (i.e., a fraction exp[−N] as N → ∞) choices or efficient states/solutions correspond to full utilisation of the restaurants and all the customers getting their dinners. However, none of them correspond to any stable states, as except for the one accidentally having dinner in the highest ranking restaurant that evening, the other N − 1 customers feel dissatified (as they had to take dinners in lower ranking restaurants; paying the same price for their dinners) and tries to make a move next evening for a better dinner. This destabilises the above-mentioned "efficient" state or solution and the system starts again passing through the infinitely many socially inefficient states for long times. The number of agents not getting any dinner (unemployment measure), or equivalently, the number restaurants not getting any customer (unutilised service size) will fluctuate with time (evenings here). Following the indications [5, 6] , from the observations in the Hospital waiting list sizes, we believe that the fluctuations here will also show power law tails, although the two problems have significant differences (e.g., the absence of possibilities of iterative learning or the presence of heterogeneuity of choices in the Hospital waiting list problem).
